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Abstract 
Quantum communication in general helps deter potential eavesdropping in the course of 
transmission of bits to enable secure communication between two or more parties. In this paper, 
we propose a novel quasi-quantum secure direct communication scheme using non-maximally 
entangled states. The proposed scheme is simple to implement using existing techniques and 
significantly reduces the number of leaked bits by randomly complementing them. The associated 
bit error rates are directly controlled by the sender. As a result long sequences or the whole 
sequence of data can be communicated at once directly, before error checking for a potential 
eavesdropper. Also a cipher can be used in the protocol for retrieving the bits that are lost due to 
security. The qubit efficiency of the proposed protocol is found to be 40 %. 
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1. Introduction 
Quantum cryptography exploits the fundamental postulates of quantum mechanics to ensure 
secure communication between two or more parties. Several quantum communication schemes 
have been proposed since the introduction of the BB84 protocol in 1984 [1]. In the BB84 protocol, 
the sender makes use of the rectilinear (R) or diagonal (D) basis to encode information in single 
photons. The quantum no cloning theorem prevents a malicious third party (Eve) from copying 
the quantum state during the transmission process. The bases used are publicly announced by both 
the sender (Alice) and the receiver (Bob). They both reject the bits that were generated through 
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different bases. The remaining bits that were generated through the same basis are preserved by 
Bob. He chooses a subset of these bits and sends it to Alice. Alice calculates the error rate which 
is expected to be within a certain threshold value. If not, the presence of Eve is disclosed [2]. 
Alternatively the Ekert protocol relies on the non-locality of a shared maximally entangled pair 
between Alice and Bob. If the measurement is performed by Alice and Bob in a compatible basis, 
sifted bits are generated after publicly announcing the bases [3].  
Quantum key distribution (QKD) schemes, namely, the BB84 and the Ekert protocol are not 
used to send bits directly. However, they help establish a private key between the sender and the 
receiver. After establishing the key, bits are sent through a classical channel using an encryption 
algorithm. On the other hand, quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) schemes are used to 
communicate directly over a quantum channel without involving key generation [4]. Over the 
years, QSDC schemes using single photons, entangled states and superdense coding have been 
proposed [5-9].  
While most of the proposed schemes use maximally entangled states like Bell states, we have 
shown how non-maximally entangled states can help leverage security. Moreover, the transmission 
of maximally entangled states are more difficult than non-maximally entangled states due to 
decoherence [10]. Hence, it is worthwhile to seek quantum communication using non-maximally 
entangled states. The use of non-maximally entangled states for quantum cryptography has been 
minimal in spite of their generation in laboratories. The simple act of rotating the polarizer for the 
pump photons before striking the non-linear crystal in standard parametric down conversion 
experiments can produce such states. In this work, these states are measured by the R 
(measurement along 0°, 90°) or D (measurement along 45°, 135°) basis similar to the BB84 
protocol, and the measurement result is counted as the bit. Utilizing entanglement is possible only 
when the same basis is used. The results 0° or 45° are counted as 0 bit, and 90° or 135° are counted 
as 1 bit. 
Intentionally skewed probability amplitudes in non-maximally entangled states are used to 
deliver the intended measurement result to Bob. Incidentally, randomly complemented bits are 
introduced in the sequence due to the inherent nature of the prepared states. The percentage of bits 
to be complemented as such is controlled by the sender. The error due to complementing is 
retrievable as we will see in the ensuing discussion. QSDC schemes do not use classical bits except 
for error checking. However, our protocol uses a cipher similar to QKD where half of the resulting 
bits are transmitted in the classical channel. Hence, it can be referred to as a quasi-QSDC scheme. 
Unlike other QSDC schemes, our protocol does not involve the application of any quantum gates, 
thereby reducing complexity. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the steps involved in the protocol. 
Section 3 elucidates the security of the given protocol. Section 4 is used for discussing the various 
cases of quantum states and how they affect security. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
 
 
2. The protocol 
In this section, we introduce the protocol formally. Let N be the sequence of 𝑛 number of 
classical bits to be sent by Alice. The various steps involved in the protocol are as follows: 
 
1. Alice generates a non-maximally entangled state 𝛼|00 >  + 𝛽|11 >, where |α|2 + |𝛽|2 =
1. If Alice wants to send a 0 bit in N, she prepares the state such that |α| > |β|. To send a 
1 bit, she prepares the state such that |α| < |β|. 
2. She sends one of the qubits in the entangled pair to Bob who is expected to measure it in 
the same basis as Alice. Both Alice and Bob can measure in the rectilinear (R) or diagonal 
(D) basis. 
3. If Bob’s measurement outcome is 0, he discerns the bit as 0. If he measures 1, it’s a 1 bit. 
4. After a predetermined number of iterations or after transmitting all qubits, Bob ends up 
with a sequence N1 having 𝑛 bits. Alice and Bob exchange their basis information (whether 
R or D) through a classical channel. This information can be represented as a sequence 
with R and D representing 0 and 1, respectively. The sequence can be generated by 
quantum random number generators which are truly random unlike classical random 
number generators which are deterministic [11-13]. 
5. Bob discards the bits that are generated through different bases while noting their positions. 
Simultaneously Alice generates the sequence of bits, say A that has not reached Bob due 
to incompatible basis. Let the number of bits in the sequence A be 𝑑. Both Alice and Bob 
have generated a separate sequence of sifted bits (bits generated using the same basis) P 
and Q respectively which will have 𝑛 − 𝑑 number of elements. As one can see in the below 
security analysis, 𝑑 ≈  𝑛 − 𝑑 ≈  𝑛/2. 
6. Bob selects a subset of his sifted bits from Q and sends it along with its respective position 
to Alice through the classical channel. 
7. Alice compares it with the corresponding original bits in P and checks for any error (if the 
subset of the elements of P and Q are unequal). 
8. If the error rate of sifted bits is above a threshold value, Eve’s presence is disclosed and 
the process is terminated at this point. If the error rate is under a threshold value, Alice 
applies XOR to each bit in A and the corresponding sifted bit, A ⨁ P and this result is 
disclosed to Bob through the classical channel. Let this new bit sequence be G.  
9. Bob receives G and applies XOR with his sifted bits, G ⨁ Q = A ⨁ P ⨁ Q, which is 
equivalent to A if P and Q are equal. Bob introduces this result in the position of discarded 
bits with the previously received sifted bits Q. Hence, Bob receives 𝑛 bits which contain 
some randomly complemented bits due to the additional coefficient in the non-maximally 
entangled states. 
10. Alice announces the position of those bits through the classical channel. Bob simply 
complements the corresponding bits. Thus Bob is left with the sequence N. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 Quasi-QSDC protocol: dotted line indicates quantum channel while the normal 
ones indicate classical channel. 
 
3. Security 
If Alice and Bob measure using the same basis, their measurement outcomes must be the same 
due to the correlation in the entangled state. If Eve intercepts Alice’s photons and uses a different 
basis, her outcome is random. Hence she sends a randomized bit to Bob which might be different 
from the one Alice measures from her qubit. This reveals the presence of Eve. If the error rate 
calculated by Alice in Step 8 exceeds a certain percentage, the presence of Eve can be known. The 
error rate can be calculated as follows: 
Error Rate = Probability of Eve making an error * Probability of Bob making an error 
                   = 50 % * 50 % 
                  = 25 %  
The threshold error rate is therefore 25 %. Due to incompatible bases, Bob loses 50 % of the 
bits. This can be retrieved by a predetermined cipher. Here we use the XOR operation. Alice 
applies XOR with the bits that Bob lost and the sifted bits. Each of these sequences would have 
about 50 % of the total bits sent by Alice. After Alice sends Bob these new bits, Bob applies XOR 
with the sifted bits and the new bits that Alice sent. Note that the sifted bits are known only to 
Alice and Bob. Let s be a sifted bit and f be a corresponding bit that Bob lost and must receive 
from Alice. Bob receives s ⨁ f from Alice. With that Bob computes 
                                 𝑠 ⨁ (𝑠 ⨁ 𝑓)  =  (𝑠 ⨁ 𝑠) ⨁ 𝑓 =  0 ⨁ 𝑓 =  𝑓.                                       (1) 
Applying XOR twice with a given bit would result in the same bit. Hence Bob receives the 
previously discarded bits. He has now received all 𝑛 bits, where some are randomly 
complemented. The increased security introduced by such randomly complemented bits due to 
non-maximally entangled states can be significant. This is made possible by the small probabilities 
introduced via non-maximally entangled states. If the bit needed to be sent is 0, this error is 
introduced by the coefficient |𝛽|. Thus the bits deciphered by Eve when she uses the compatible 
basis will also be wrong by a probability of |𝛽|2. Hence, the combined bit error rate for Eve (and 
Bob) would be [50 + 50*(|𝛽|2)] % (note that the error additional to 50% is recoverable through 
complementing) before and during error checking. In short, the leaked bits due to compatible basis 
are not reliable too for Eve. This allows us to send long sequences of data before error checking 
as Eve’s presence will introduce her to redundant information from randomly complemented bits 
(even when she uses the same bases as Alice). The value of |𝛽| can be increased by Alice as the 
sequence of bits to be transmitted at a time gets longer. This is in contrast to the block transmission 
technique employed in most QSDC schemes. Hence, the proposed protocol offers a solution for 
communicating through an eavesdropping strategy. If the transmission is free from eavesdropping, 
Alice can announce the position of bits to be complemented at the end of the protocol. She can 
rather avoid the announcement if she finds Bob suspicious too. Alice can keep a track on the result 
of Bob’s qubit due to the correlation. As a result, qubits are not lost in the process of increasing 
security through the use of non-maximally entangled states.  
Additionally, classical bits are used in error checking and for the cipher apart from qubits. It’s 
therefore important to quantify the efficiency of the scheme. The theoretical qubit efficiency of a 
protocol is defined as  
 
                                                        𝜂 =  
𝑐
𝑞 + 𝑏
 ,                                      (2) 
 
where 𝑐 is the number of bits received by Bob, 𝑞 is the number of qubits transmitted by Alice and 
b is the number of classical bits exchanged between Alice and Bob [14]. Here 𝑐 = 1, 𝑞 = 1 
and 𝑏 =  1 +  0.5 =  1.5, where 𝑏 includes the basis exchanged and the position of bits to be 
complemented. Thus 𝜂 =  0.4 and the efficiency of the proposed protocol is 40%. 
 
4. Role of various quantum states in security 
The coefficients |α| and |𝛽| can also follow specific values that are set by Alice unlike the one 
mentioned in Step 1 of the protocol. For example, she may set |𝛼| < |𝛽| to send a 0 bit. The 
number of bits to be complemented gets higher as a result. The bit error rate will approach 100 % 
as |𝛽|2 gets closer to 1. The following graph shows the bit error rate for corresponding values of 
|𝛽| before error checking. 
 Fig. 2 Relation between |𝛽| and BER % 
 
The case of maximally entangled states where |α|2 = |𝛽|2 =  0.5 or |α| = |𝛽| =  0.7071 is 
also possible. The bit error rate in this case would be 75 %. Since the coefficients are independent 
of the message bits, the maximally entangled case corresponds to perfect secrecy. Values for |𝛽|2 
close to 1 are not useful as Eve can complement all the sifted bits if she wants. At the same time, 
very small values are not useful as only a few bits would be complemented. Alice can also control 
the bit error rate if she becomes suspicious during the protocol as she can control the coefficients 
of the non-maximally entangled states in real time. This can be achieved by rotating the pump 
polarization with respect to the vertical or horizontal by an angle Ɵ.  A non-maximally entangled 
state can be expressed as (𝜀|00 >  + |11 >)/√𝜀2 + 1 where 0 < ε < 1 and the degree of 
entanglement, 𝜀 =  𝑡𝑎𝑛 Ɵ [15]. Hence Alice can control α and β by controlling Ɵ. A central 
satellite source can also help share an entangled pair (preferably maximal) between Alice and Bob 
[16]. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In the proposed quasi-QSDC scheme, different bases are used along with non-maximally 
entangled states to achieve secure communication. This is also favorable for transmitting qubits as 
non-maximally entangled states are more robust than maximally entangled states. One half of the 
sequence of bits is sent by generating sifted bits and the other half uses a cipher with the sifted 
bits. The position of bits to be complemented is announced by Alice at the end. The scheme also 
highlights how security can be increased through non-maximally entangled states without losing 
any qubits, but at the cost of post processing the bits on the receiver side. The resulting efficiency 
of the protocol is 40%. The case of maximally entangled states can serve as the middle ground for 
the bit error rates. For practical applications, the sender can use the range of bit error rates lesser 
than 75 % to reduce post processing and achieve faster results. Alice can constantly make a choice 
between faster post processing and increased security. 
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